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Abstract
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations.
When randomization is allowed, it is possible to achieve compelling notions of fairness such as
envy-freeness, which states that no agent should prefer any other agent’s allocation to her own.
When allocations must be deterministic, achieving exact fairness is impossible but approximate
notions such as envy-freeness up to one good can be guaranteed. Our goal in this work is to
achieve both simultaneously, by constructing a randomized allocation that is exactly fair ex-ante
and approximately fair ex-post. The key question we address is whether ex-ante envy-freeness
can be achieved in combination with ex-post envy-freeness up to one good. We settle this
positively by designing an efficient algorithm that achieves both properties simultaneously. If
we additionally require economic efficiency, we obtain an impossibility result. However, we show
that economic efficiency and ex-ante envy-freeness can be simultaneously achieved if we slightly
relax our ex-post fairness guarantee. On our way, we characterize the well-known Maximum
Nash Welfare allocation rule in terms of a recently introduced fairness guarantee that applies
to groups of agents, not just individuals.
1 Introduction
What is fair? What is just? These questions have captivated many brilliant minds in human history,
from the ancient Greek philosopher Plato to the renowned political philosopher John Rawls [39]. In
the last decade or so, with algorithms increasingly making decisions that affect human lives, fairness
has been a subject of intense research in the context of algorithmic decision-making [23]. Some of
this research draws on the — almost a century old [42] — literature on fair resource allocation.
The central problem in fair resource allocation is, as the name suggests, to fairly allocate a
set of resources (often dubbed goods) among a set of individuals (often dubbed agents) who have
different preferences over the resources. Much of the early economic work treats the resources as
divisible. For example, in the classic cake-cutting setting [42], the “cake” is to be split among the
agents. An agent’s preferences are expressed through a valuation function, which places a value on
every subset of the cake. Traditionally, this valuation function is assumed to be additive, that is, an
agent’s value for receiving disjoint parts of the cake is the sum of her values for the individual parts.
The possibility of finely dividing the cake allows allocating it with compelling fairness guarantees.
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For example, Stromquist [43] showed that one can always allocate the cake in a way that is envy-free
(EF), i.e., such that no agent values the share of the cake allocated to another agent more than the
share allocated to herself.
Now imagine if the goods are indivisible, i.e., each good must be entirely allocated to a single
agent. In other words, the allocation to each agent is a subset of the set of goods. If we are allowed
to randomize, then we can choose an agent uniformly at random and allocate the entire set of
goods to her. This is trivially ex-ante envy-free, since all agents receive the same distribution over
bundles of goods. However, this allocation induces a large amount of envy ex-post, since one agent
receives everything and all others receive nothing.
It is obvious that some amount of ex-post envy is unavoidable; imagine two agents liking a
single good, which must be given to one of them, leaving the other envious. This difficulty has
led to significant research on fairness in deterministic allocations of indivisible goods in economics
and computer science [15], a bulk of which focuses on relaxed fairness properties which can be
guaranteed on all instances. One compelling example is envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), which
requires that the envy of any agent toward another agent can be removed by the elimination of at
most one good from the envied agent’s bundle.
It is known that a deterministic EF1 allocation always exists [35, 17]. Such an allocation keeps
the ex-post envy limited, but it may still be perceived as unfair if some agents are systemati-
cally favored over others. For example, if two agents agree on their ordinal preference ranking
over two goods but have different strengths of preference, the popular Maximum Nash Welfare
(MNW) [36, 33, 19] allocation rule1 assigns the more valuable good to the agent with higher inten-
sity of preference for it over the less valuable good, and the less valuable good to the other agent.
If this allocation happens repeatedly, the scale will always be tipped towards the same agent and
their advantage over time will become large.
One might hope that, at least for the case of repeated allocation, more dedicated solutions could
be designed. For instance, the goods could be allocated by the round-robin method — where the
agents choose goods one at a time in a fixed order — in each round, while cycling through all n!
possible orderings of the agents so that no one is repeatedly favored by the mechanism. However,
as we will see later, this seemingly-fair solution is not enough to guarantee envy-freeness in the
long run. Further, it does nothing to alleviate unfairness in a one-shot setting, where ex-ante envy-
freeness may still be desired as agents may be unwilling to participate in a system in which they
know they will certainly be treated less favorably than their competitors.
This motivates a natural question. Can we retain envy-freeness up to one good as an ex-post
guarantee, and simultaneously obtain (exact) envy-freeness ex-ante? In other words, can we always
randomize over EF1 allocations such that the resulting randomized allocation is EF? We show that
the answer to this natural and elegant question is yes. More generally, we study various combina-
tions of ex-ante and ex-post fairness and efficiency guarantees, and identify combinations that can
(and cannot) be achieved simultaneously. Our constructive results yield efficient algorithms; these
improve upon prior algorithms which provide either only ex-ante or only ex-post guarantees, thus
paving the way for fairer resource allocation in practice.
1The MNW allocation is the one that maximizes the product of agent utilities. This is the rule employed by the
popular fair division website Spliddit (http://spliddit.org).
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Prop1 + EF11 EF1 EF1 + PO EF1 + fPO
Prop ✓ ✓ ? ✗ (Thm 3)
EF ✓ ✓ (Thm 2) ? ✗
GF ✓ (Cor 1) ✗ (Thm 3) ✗ ✗
Table 1: Summary of our results. Each row corresponds to an ex-ante guarantee while each column
corresponds to an ex-post guarantee. A ✓ indicates possibility (and polynomial-time computation),
a ✗ indicates impossibility, and a ? indicates an open problem. Note that positive results propagate
above and to the left, while negative results propagate below and to the right.
1.1 Our Results
Our main result is the development of a novel algorithm, Recursive Probabilistic Serial, that pro-
duces an ex-ante envy-free (EF) distribution over deterministic allocations that each satisfy envy-
freeness up to one good (EF1). Our algorithm is an adaptation of the classic Probabilistic Serial
(PS) algorithm of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [13] that inherits much of the desirable behavior of
PS (in particular, ex-ante envy-freeness), while also allowing a simple and natural decomposition
over EF1 allocations. While a na¨ıve version of our algorithm yields a distribution over a possibly-
exponential number of deterministic allocations, we show that a support size polynomial in the
number of agents and goods is sufficient, thus yielding an efficient variant.
In addition to ex-ante EF and ex-post EF1, one may want to achieve the economic efficiency
notion of Pareto optimality, which states that it should be impossible to find an allocation that
improves some agent’s utility without reducing any other agent’s. In Section 4 we show that it is
impossible to achieve ex-ante Pareto optimality (that is, with respect to the randomized allocation)
in conjunction with ex-ante EF and ex-post EF1. However, in Section 5 we show that strong ex-ante
guarantees — in terms of both fairness and economic efficiency — can be achieved if we are willing
to compromise on the ex-post guarantee. In particular, we are able to achieve ex-ante group fairness
(GF) [22], which generalizes both envy-freeness and Pareto optimality, in conjunction with two ex-
post fairness properties that are incomparable but are both implied by EF1: proportionality up to
one good (Prop1) [21] and envy-freeness up to one good more-and-less (EF 11) [9]. Our algorithm uses
a rounding of the well-known MNW allocation, and in Section 6, we provide a novel characterization
which shows that this is the only allocation rule that can be used to achieve the desired properties.
Table 1 summarizes our results.
Finally, in Section 7, we extend our results to the case of bads. In particular, for Recursive
Probabilistic Serial, we show that the natural extension only manages to achieve ex-post EF2 (in
addition to ex-ante EF), but ex-post EF1 can be recovered through a simple modification.
1.2 Related Work
A large body of work in computer science and economics has focused on finding exactly ex-ante
fair randomized allocations, as well as approximately fair deterministic allocations, and we cite
those works as appropriate throughout the paper. Combining the two approaches was recently
listed as an “interesting challenge” by Aziz [5], however, little work has focused on this problem.
Two exceptions are Aleksandrov et al. [3] and Budish et al. [18]. Aleksandrov et al. [3] consider
randomized allocation mechanisms for an online fair division problem and analyze their ex-ante
and ex-post fairness guarantees. The style of their results is very similar to ours, however they
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restrict attention to binary utilities, which simplifies the problem significantly. Budish et al. [18]
study the problem of implementing a general class of random allocation mechanisms subject to
ex-post constraints, although the ex-post constraints are not the same as ours. In particular, they
do not consider ex-post axiomatic guarantees from the fair division literature as we do.
In the random assignment literature in economics, the idea of constructing a fractional as-
signment and implementing it as a lottery over pure assignments was introduced by Hylland and
Zeckhauser [32]. Later work has studied both ex-ante and ex-post fairness and efficiency guarantees
provided by mechanisms in this setting [13, 1, 20, 37], but most of this work studies ordinal utilities
and does not consider approximate notions of ex-post fairness.2 Gajdos and Tallon [27] study the
relationship between ex-ante and ex-post fairness but in their model the randomness comes from
nature, not the allocation rule. Other work studies the problem of implementing a fractional out-
come over deterministic outcomes subject to (possibly soft) constraints [18, 2], but the constraints
allowed by these papers do not fully capture our ex-post fairness notions.
In Section 6, we obtain a characterization of the maximum Nash welfare (MNW) rule — this
is equivalent to competitive equilibrium with equal incomes (CEEI) [25, 4], and is also known as
the competitive rule or the Walras rule — for fractional allocations using group fairness and a
property called replication-invariance. There are several related characterizations in the literature.
Assuming monotonic and strictly convex preferences, it is known that CEEI is the only replication-
invariant allocation rule that is in the core [24], or group envy-free [45], or proportional and Pareto
optimal [44]. While the core, group envy-freeness, or proportionality together with Pareto opti-
mality are all weaker than group fairness (making these characterizations seemingly stronger), to
the best of our knowledge, these characterizations only apply for strictly convex preferences, and
not to additive preferences. We also note that our proof technique is significantly different from
the proofs of these prior characterizations because additive preferences do not admit some of the
nice structural implications that strictly convex preferences do when combined with replication
invariance, as we note in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
For any positive integer r ∈ N, define [r] := {1, . . . , r}. Let N = [n] denote a set of agents, and M
denote a set of goods where m := |M |.
Fractional and Randomized Allocations A fractional allocation of the items in M to the
agents in N is specified by a non-negative n × m matrix A ∈ [0, 1]n×m such that for every item
j ∈ M , we have
∑
i∈N Ai,j ≤ 1; here, Ai,j denotes the fraction of item j assigned to agent i. We
say that a fractional allocation A is complete if
∑
i∈N Ai,j = 1 for every j ∈ M , and call it partial
otherwise.
A fractional allocation A is integral if Ai,j ∈ {0, 1} for every i ∈ N and j ∈ M . For integral
allocations, we will find it convenient to denote the binary vector Ai = (Ai,j)j∈M as a set Ai :=
{j ∈M : Ai,j = 1}. We will refer to Ai as the bundle of items assigned to agent i, and denote the
allocation A as an ordered tuple of bundles A = (A1, . . . , An). When we simply say ‘an allocation’,
it will mean a fractional allocation, unless otherwise clear from the context. For notational clarity,
2The standard random assignment setting has n agents, n items, and requires that each agent receive exactly
one item. The notion of ex-post fairness that we use in this work, envy-freeness up to one good, is vacuous in this
restricted setting.
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we use letters X or Y for fractional allocations, and write A or B for integral allocations. Let X
be the set of all (complete or partial) fractional allocations.
A randomized allocation is a lottery over integral allocations (we denote them by bold letters
for clarity). Formally, a randomized allocation X is specified by a set of ℓ ∈ N ordered pairs
{(pk, Ak)}k∈[ℓ], where, for every k ∈ [ℓ], A
k is an integral allocation implemented with probability
pk ∈ [0, 1], and
∑
k∈[ℓ] p
k = 1. The support of X is the set of integral allocations {A1, . . . , Aℓ}.
A randomized allocation X := {(pk, Ak)}k∈[ℓ] is naturally associated with the fractional alloca-
tion X :=
∑
k∈[ℓ] p
kAk, where Xi,j is the (marginal) probability of agent i receiving good j underX.
In this case, we say that randomized allocation X implements fractional allocation X. There may
be many randomized allocations implementing a given fractional allocation. In Sections 3 and 5,
we discuss and make use of two known techniques for implementing a given fractional allocation.
Preferences Each agent i ∈ N has an additive valuation function vi, where vi,j ≥ 0 denotes the
agent’s utility for fully receiving good j ∈ M . Later, in Section 7, we consider allocation of bads,
where vi,j ≤ 0 for each agent i ∈ N and bad j ∈ M . Note that vi induces a weak order <i over
goods where gj <i gk if and only if vi,j ≥ vi,k, and gj ≻i gk if and only if vi,j > vi,k. The utility of
agent i under an allocation X ∈ X is given by vi(Xi) =
∑
j∈M Xi,j · vi,j. We assume that for each
good j ∈M , there exists at least one agent i ∈ N with vi,j > 0. This is without loss of generality
as goods valued zero by everyone can be allocated arbitrarily.
Allocation rule A fair division instance I is defined by the triple (N,M, (vi)i∈N ). We let I denote
the set of all instances. An allocation rule f : I → 2X maps instances to (sets of) allocations.
Definition 1 (Fractional Maximum Nash Welfare Rule). Given an instance I ∈ I, the fractional
Maximum Nash Welfare (MNW) rule returns all fractional allocations that maximize the product of
agents’ utilities, i.e., MNW(I) := argmaxX∈X Πi∈N vi(Xi). We refer to an allocation A ∈ MNW(I)
as a fractional MNW allocation. Integral MNW allocations maximize the product of agents’ utilities
across all integral allocations; however, there is a subtle tie-breaking involved in that case [19].
We now discuss a number of properties concerning fairness and efficiency of allocations and
allocation rules.
2.1 Fairness and Efficiency Properties
For any property 〈P 〉 defined for a fractional allocation, we say that a randomized allocation X
satisfies 〈P 〉 ex-ante if the fractional allocation X it implements satisfies 〈P 〉. Similarly, for any
property 〈Q〉 defined for an integral allocation, we say that a randomized allocation X satisfies 〈Q〉
ex-post if every integral allocation in its support satisfies 〈Q〉.
We begin with a classic fairness notion called proportionality.
Definition 2 (Proportionality (Prop) [42]). An allocation X is proportional if for each agent i ∈ N ,
vi(Xi) ≥ vi(~1
m)/n, where vi(~1
m) is agent i’s utility for receiving all goods fully.
For complete allocations, the following fairness guarantee is logically stronger than proportion-
ality, and has been a subject of substantial research.
Definition 3 (Envy-Freeness (EF) [26]). An allocation X is envy-free if for every pair of agents
i, h ∈ N , we have vi(Xi) ≥ vi(Xh).
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Given allocations X and Y , we say that agent i SD-prefers Xi to Yi, written Xi <
SD
i Yi, if for
every good g ∈M , we have that
∑
gj∈{g′∈M :g′<ig}
Xi,j ≥
∑
gj∈{g′∈M :g′<ig}
Yi,j. Here, “SD” refers to
first-order stochastic dominance. It is easy to check that Xi <
SD
i Yi is equivalent to v
′
i(Xi) ≥ v
′
i(Yi)
under every additive valuation v′i consistent with the ordinal preference relation <i.
Definition 4 (SD-Envy-Freeness (SD-EF) [13]). An allocation X is SD-envy-free if for every pair
of agents i, h ∈ N , we have Xi <
SD
i Xh.
Equivalently, an allocation is SD-envy-free if it is envy-free under any additive valuation func-
tions of the agents consistent with (<i)i∈N . Next, we discuss economic efficiency of allocations.
Definition 5 (Fractional Pareto Optimality (fPO) [10] and Pareto Optimality (PO)). An allocation
X is fractionally Pareto optimal if there is no fractional allocation Y that Pareto-dominates it, i.e.,
satisfies vi(Yi) ≥ vi(Xi) for all agents i ∈ N and at least one inequality is strict. An integral
allocation A is Pareto optimal if there is no integral allocation B that Pareto-dominates it.
For fractional allocations, fPO is traditionally just referred to as Pareto optimality, so we will
use fPO and PO interchangeably. However, for integral allocations, fPO is stronger than PO.
Proposition 1. If a randomized allocation is ex-ante PO, then it is also ex-post fPO.
Proof. If a randomized allocation X := {(pk, Ak)}k∈[ℓ] implementing a fractional allocation X is not
ex-post fPO, then for some k ∈ [ℓ], integral allocation Ak must be Pareto dominated by a fractional
allocation, say Y . Then, the fractional allocation X ′ := pk · Y +
∑
r 6=k p
r ·Ar Pareto-dominates X,
which implies that X is not ex-ante PO.
The following property generalizes various properties mentioned above. Given any set S ⊆ N
of agents, we write ∪i∈SXi to denote the union of the fractional allocations to agents in S, i.e.,
∪i∈SXi := (
∑
i∈S Xi,j)j∈M .
Definition 6 (Group Fairness (GF) [22]). An allocation X is group fair if for all non-empty
subsets of agents S, T ⊆ N , there is no fractional allocation Y of ∪i∈TXi to the agents in S such
that |S||T | · vi(Yi) ≥ vi(Xi) for all agents i ∈ S and at least one inequality is strict.
Note that imposing the above constraint over restricted (S, T ) pairs can recover properties such
as proportionality (|S| = 1, T = N), envy-freeness (|S| = |T | = 1), and fractional Pareto optimality
(S = T = N).
While the fairness properties mentioned above are compelling, they cannot be guaranteed with
integral allocations. For such allocations, it is meaningful to consider approximate fairness notions,
some of which are discussed below.
Definition 7 (Proportionality Up To One Good (Prop1) [21]). An integral allocation A is pro-
portional up to one good if for every agent i ∈ N , either vi(Ai) ≥ vi(~1
m)/n or there exists a good
j /∈ Ai such that vi(Ai) + vi,j ≥ vi(~1
m)/n, where vi(~1
m) is agent i’s utility for receiving all goods
fully.
Definition 8 (Envy-Freeness Up To One Good (EF1) [35, 17]). An integral allocation A is envy-free
up to one good if for every pair of agents i, h ∈ N such that Ah 6= ∅, we have vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Ah \ {j})
for some good j ∈ Ah.
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All of our possibility and impossibility results also apply for the following natural strengthening
of EF1, which has been formally defined in subsequent work [7].
Definition 9 (SD-Envy-Freeness up to One Good (SD-EF1)). An integral allocation A is SD-envy-
free up to one good if for every pair of agents i, h ∈ N such that Ah 6= ∅, we have Ai <
SD
i Ah \ {j}
for some good j ∈ Ah.
This is equivalent to agent i not envying agent h up to one good under every additive valuation
consistent with the ordinal preference relation <i.
The following property is a relaxation of EF1 and enjoys strong algorithmic support in conjunc-
tion with PO, for goods (Section 5) as well as bads (Section 7) [9, 16].
Definition 10 (Envy-Freeness Up To One Good More-and-Less (EF11) [9]). An integral allocation
A is envy-free up to one good more-and-less if for every pair of agents i, h ∈ N such that Ah 6= ∅,
we have vi(Ai ∪ {ji}) ≥ vi(Ah \ {jh}) for some goods ji /∈ Ai and jh ∈ Ah.
These three guarantees are logically related as follows: SD-EF1 =⇒ EF1 =⇒ EF11 and SD-
EF1 =⇒ EF1 =⇒ Prop1.
3 Possibility: Ex-ante EF + Ex-post EF1
This section describes our main result that ex-ante envy-freeness can be achieved in conjunction
with ex-post envy-freeness up to one good (EF1).
A natural approach towards this question is to start with the round-robin method. Under this
method, we fix an agent ordering, and then agents take turns picking one good at a time in a cyclic
fashion. At each step, an agent picks her most valuable good that is still available. It is well-
known that for any agent ordering, this method produces an integral allocation that is EF1 [19].
Further, it is easy to see that uniformly randomizing the agent ordering — the so-called randomized
round-robin method — also achieves ex-ante proportionality.
Proposition 2. With additive valuations, randomized round-robin is ex-ante proportional and ex-
post envy-free up to one good.
Proof. We already noticed that randomized round-robin is ex-post EF1. For ex-ante Prop, fix
an agent i, and suppose, without loss of generality, that vi,1 ≥ vi,2 ≥ . . . ≥ vi,m. For ease of
presentation, suppose that m = cn for some positive integer c. When agent i is k-th in the
ordering, her value for her allocation is at least vi,k + vi,k+n + . . .+ vi,k+(c−1)n =
∑c
c′=1 vi,(c′−1)n+k
because the c′-th good she chooses must be no less preferred than her (c′−1)n+k-th most preferred
good. Since she appears in every position in the ordering with probability 1/n, her expected value is
at least 1n
∑m
k=1
∑c
c′=1 vi,(c′−1)n+k =
1
n
∑m
j=1 gi,j, which matches her proportionality guarantee.
However, as we observe below, this approach fails to achieve ex-ante envy-freeness.
Example 1. Consider an instance with three agents a1, a2, a3 and three goods g1, g2, g3 as shown
below (where 0 < ε < 0.25):3
3We note that a similar instance was used by Aziz and Ye [6, Proposition 13] in the divisible goods (i.e., cake
cutting) setting to show that a constrained serial dictatorship mechanism violates envy-freeness.
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g1 g2 g3
a1 1 + ε 1 1− 4ε
a2 1− 4ε 1 + ε 1
a3 1 + ε 1− 4ε 1
The allocations produced by various agent orderings are as follows: The order (a1, a2, a3) in-
duces the allocation A1 = ({g1}, {g2}, {g3}), the order (a1, a3, a2) induces the allocation A
2 =
({g1}, {g2}, {g3}), the order (a2, a1, a3) induces the allocation A
3 = ({g1}, {g2}, {g3}), the order
(a2, a3, a1) induces the allocation A
4 = ({g3}, {g2}, {g1}), the order (a3, a1, a2) induces the alloca-
tion A5 = ({g2}, {g3}, {g1}), and the order (a3, a2, a1) induces the allocation A
6 = ({g3}, {g2}, {g1}).
Let A := 16 (A
1 + · · ·+A6) denote the fractional allocation implemented by randomized round-
robin. Notice that v1(A1) = 3(1 + ε) + 1 + 2(1 − 4ε) = 6− 5ε and v1(A2) = 5 + (1− 4ε) = 6− 4ε,
implying that a1 envies a2.
Let us revisit our motivating example from the introduction, where the same set of goods need to
be allocated repeatedly over time. As we discussed, a seemingly promising solution is to use round-
robin every time, and cycle through all n! possible agent orderings to eliminate the “advantage”
that any agent has over another in a specific ordering. In the long run, the allocation produced
would resemble the fractional allocation returned by randomized round-robin. While Proposition 2
shows that this would guarantee each agent her proportional share in the long run, Example 1
points out that envy may not vanish, even in the long run.
Instead of starting from a method that guarantees ex-post EF1 and using it to achieve ex-ante
EF, let us do the opposite: Start from a fractional EF allocation and implement it using integral
EF1 allocations. Probabilistic serial is a well-studied algorithm that produces a fractional envy-
free allocation [13]. This algorithm uses a serial eating protocol wherein all agents simultaneously
start eating their respective favorite goods at the same constant speed. Once a good is completely
consumed by a subset of agents, each of those agents proceeds to eating her favorite available good
at the same speed. The algorithm terminates when all goods have been eaten, and the fraction of
each good consumed by an agent is allocated to her. A useful property of this algorithm is that it
only uses the ordinal preferences of agents over goods, and computes an allocation that is ex-ante
envy-free for any additive utilities consistent with the ordinal preferences; thus, it is SD-envy-free.
In Section 3.1, we present a variant of this procedure, which we call recursive probabilistic
serial, that provides the desired fairness guarantees, i.e., ex-ante EF and ex-post EF1. While
this procedure efficiently produces a sample integral allocation, computing the full randomized
allocation it returns may take exponential time. Later, in Section 3.2, we describe a modification
of this procedure that runs in strongly polynomial time.
It is worth noting that in a follow-up to our work, Aziz [7] has shown that the fractional allo-
cation produced by probabilistic serial can also be implemented using an ex-post EF1 randomized
allocation. The key idea in his proof is to consider multiple “copies” of each agent—one for each
unit of time—such that the i-th copy consumes the same good(s) as consumed by the agent be-
tween the time steps t = i− 1 and t = i. The desired implementation is then obtained by applying
Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem to the “expanded” allocation matrix whose columns comprise of
the goods, and rows comprise of all copies of each agent.
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3.1 Recursive Probabilistic Serial
The eating protocol used by the probabilistic serial algorithm can be formally defined as follows:
Given as input a subset of goods M ′ ⊆M , the algorithm allows each agent to consume its favorite
available good in M ′ out of those that have not yet been fully consumed at a rate of one good per
unit time. Let Xt := Eating(M ′, t) denote the (partial) allocation obtained when the algorithm is
run for t units of time. Note that Eating(M, ⌈mn ⌉) is equivalent to the outcome of the probabilistic
serial algorithm [13].
We will make use of the following classic theorem [12, 47], stated in a general form.
Theorem 1 (Birkhoff-von Neumann). Let X be a real-valued n×m matrix such that
1. Xij ∈ [0, 1] for every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m],
2.
∑m
j=1Xij ≤ 1 for every i ∈ [n], and
3.
∑n
i=1Xij ≤ 1 for every j ∈ [m].
Then, in strongly polynomial time, one can compute integral matrices A1, A2, . . . , Aq and weights
w1, w2, . . . , wq ∈ [0, 1] such that
1.
∑q
k=1w
k = 1 and X =
∑q
k=1w
kAk,
2. for each integral matrix Ak, we have Akij ∈ {0, 1} for every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], and
3. for every k ∈ [q], we have
(a) ⌊
∑m
j=1Xij⌋ ≤
∑m
j=1A
k
ij ≤ ⌈
∑m
j=1Xij⌉ for every i ∈ [n], and
(b) ⌊
∑n
i=1Xij⌋ ≤
∑n
i=1A
k
ij ≤ ⌈
∑n
i=1Xij⌉ for every j ∈ [m].
We will now describe our algorithm. The algorithm proceeds in stages. In each stage, the
Eating procedure is run for one unit of time, after which every agent has consumed a total mass
of one item (although an individual item may be fractionally consumed). Then, Theorem 1 is
used to decompose this fractional (partial) allocation into integral allocations. By implication (3a)
of Theorem 1, each agent receives exactly one item in each integral allocation in the support.
We interpret the weights w1, . . . , wq as probabilities, and sample an integral allocation from this
distribution before proceeding to the next stage. The algorithm then fixes the assignments of the
goods to the agents in accordance with the aforementioned integral partial allocation, and repeats
the eating procedure with the reduced set of goods. In the final stage of the algorithm, fewer
than n goods might remain, in which case some agents do not receive any good under the integral
allocation. The full procedure is described in Algorithm 1. Note that Algorithm 1 is a randomized
algorithm that returns an integral allocation in every execution. One could, however, also consider
the implied fractional allocation, which is obtained by taking expectation over the randomness in
Line 6. Algorithm 3 in Appendix D provides the pseudocode for a recursive formulation of the
algorithm. Example 2 illustrates the execution of our algorithm.
Example 2. Consider an instance with four goods and two agents a1, a2. The preferences of a1
and a2 are such that v1(g1) > v1(g2) > v1(g3) > v1(g4) and v1(g1) > v1(g3) > v1(g2) > v1(g4). In
the first stage of the algorithm, a1 consumes half of g1 and half of g2, while a2 consumes half of g1
and half of g3. Figure 1 shows the corresponding fractional allocation and its decomposition.
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Algorithm 1 Ex-ante EF + ex-post EF1
1: B ← (∅, . . . , ∅) ⊲ Initialize the allocation
2: M0 ←M ⊲ Initialize the set of available goods
3: for t = 1 to ⌈mn ⌉ do
4: Xt ← Eating(M t, 1) ⊲ Run the eating protocol for one unit of time
5: BvN: Xt =
∑ℓ
k=1w
t,kAt,k ⊲ Decomposition from Theorem 1
6: Bt ← At,k with probability wt,k ⊲ Sampling step
7: M t+1 ←M t \
⋃
i∈N B
t
i ⊲ Fix the assignments according to the sampled allocation
8: Bi ← Bi ∪
⌈m
n
⌉
t=1 B
t
i for all i ∈ N ⊲ Update integral allocation
9: end for
10: return B
0.5 0.5 0 0
0.5 0 0.5 0




X1
= 0.5 ×
1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0




A1
+ 0.5 ×
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0




A2
Figure 1: The fractional allocation X1 and its decomposition used in Example 2.
Suppose the integral allocation sampled by the algorithm is A1 (this happens with probability
0.5). Thus, a1 is allocated g1 and a2 is allocated g3, leaving g2 and g4 remaining in the second stage.
Since both agents prefer g2 to g4, each agent consumes half of each good. Therefore, conditioned
on allocation A1 being sampled in the first stage, each agent is allocated each of g2 and g4 with
probability 0.5 at the end of the second stage. The corresponding distribution is given by
0.5×
[
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
]
+ 0.5 ×
[
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
]
.
Similarly, if allocation A2 is sampled at the end of first stage, then each of the two agents gets half
of g3 and g4, resulting in the following (conditional) distribution at the end of second stage:
0.5×
[
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
]
+ 0.5 ×
[
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
]
.
Combining the above observations, we get that the distribution over integral allocations pro-
duced by Algorithm 1 on this example is
0.25 ×
[
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
]
+ 0.25×
[
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
]
+ 0.25 ×
[
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
]
+ 0.25 ×
[
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
]
.
Observe that the fractional allocation returned by Algorithm 1 differs from that returned by
the probabilistic serial algorithm on this example. Indeed, the latter assigns g2 exclusively to a1
and g3 exclusively to a2, whereas Algorithm 1 does not. As a consequence, Algorithm 1 fails to
satisfy ordinal efficiency, which is satisfied by probabilistic serial.
We will first show that every integral allocation returned by Algorithm 1 satisfies EF1. The
proof relies crucially on the following lemma.
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Lemma 1. Let t < ⌈m/n⌉. Let gi,t denote the good allocated to agent i in iteration t of Algorithm 1.
Then agent i (weakly) prefers gi,t to all goods in M
t+1 (goods unallocated after t iterations of the
algorithm).
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists a good g∗ ∈ M t+1 such that vi(g
∗) > vi(gi,t).
Then, by Theorem 1, agent i must have eaten a non-zero share of good gi,t in iteration t. On the
other hand, g∗ ∈M t+1 implies that g∗ ∈M t, and thus g∗ must not be fully consumed in iteration
t (i.e.,
∑t
s=1
∑n
i=1B
s
i,g∗ < 1). However, since vi(g
∗) > vi(g), agent i should have then consumed g
∗
before consuming gi,t in iteration t, which is a contradiction.
Lemma 2. Every integral allocation returned by Algorithm 1 satisfies EF1.
Proof. For any i ∈ [n], let gi,t denote the good received by agent i in iteration t (if such a good
exists). Fix a pair of agents i, k ∈ N . By Lemma 1, for every t < ⌈m/n⌉, we have vi(gi,t) ≥ vi(gk,t+1)
because gk,t+1 ∈M
t+1. Hence,
vi(Ai) ≥
⌈m/n⌉−1∑
t=1
vi(gi,t) ≥
⌈m/n⌉∑
t=2
vi(gk,t) = vi(Ak \ {gk,1}),
which establishes EF1.
Theorem 2. The randomized allocation implemented by Algorithm 1 is ex-ante envy-free and ex-
post EF1.
Proof. The ex-post EF1 guarantee follows readily from Lemma 2. To prove ex-ante EF, notice
that each agent eats her most preferred available good at each point in time during the Eating
algorithm. Therefore, for any iteration t, the partial fractional allocation Xt computed by the
Eating(·) procedure in iteration t is envy-free.
Fix a pair of agents i, h ∈ N . We want to show that E[vi(Bi)] ≥ E[vi(Bh)]. Note that Bi =⋃⌈m/n⌉
t=1 B
t
i and Bh =
⋃⌈m/n⌉
t=1 B
t
h. Due to additive preferences and linearity of expectation, it is
sufficient to show that for every t, E[vi(B
t
i)] ≥ E[vi(B
t
h)]. Note that conditioned on B
1, . . . , Bt−1,
the expected value of any agent for Bti is the value of that agent for X
t
i . Hence, for each possible
value of B1, . . . , Bt−1, envy-freeness of Xt implies that
E[vi(B
t
i )|B
1, . . . , Bt−1] = E[vi(X
t
i )|B
1, . . . , Bt−1] ≥ E[vi(X
t
h)|B
1, . . . , Bt−1] = E[vi(B
t
h)|B
1, . . . , Bt−1],
as desired.
Note that like probabilistic serial, Recursive Probabilistic Serial (Algorithm 1) takes only the
ordinal preferences of agents over goods as input; thus, it is in fact ex-ante SD-EF and ex-post
SD-EF1.
3.2 A Polynomial-Time Algorithm for Ex-ante EF and Ex-post EF1
Note that recursive probabilistic serial (Algorithm 1) efficiently produces a sample integral EF1
allocation, but computing the full randomized allocation constructed by it would require exponential
time. This is because at each iteration, the algorithm “branches out” into a polynomial number
of subinstances (equal to the size of the support in the BvN decomposition) and this happens
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polynomially many times. Also, for the same reason, the randomized allocation it constructs can,
in the worst case, have an exponential number of integral allocations in the support.
A natural approach towards reducing the support size (in the hope of reducing the overall run-
ning time) is to use the well-known Carathe´odory’s theorem from convex analysis, which states that
if a point x ∈ Rd lies in the convex hull of a set P , then x can be expressed as a convex combination
of at most d+1 vertices of P . Since any fractional allocation X is a point in an n×m-dimensional
space (i.e., X ∈ Rn×m), by Carathe´odory’s theorem, if it is a convex combination of integral al-
locations in the support {A1, . . . , Aℓ}, then it can also be written as a convex combination of at
most mn+1 allocations from this set. While this establishes the existence of a convex combination
with small support, it does not automatically provide an efficient algorithm for converting a convex
combination with large support to one with small support. Indeed, reducing the support size to at
most mn+1 once it has already grown exponentially may not be possible efficiently. Instead, in our
modification of recursive probabilistic serial, we ensure that the support size remains mn+ 1 after
every step of “branching out”. Note that every step of “branching out” can increase the support
size from mn+ 1 to (mn + 1) · p(m,n), where p(m,n) is a polynomial that bounds the size of the
support produced by the BvN decomposition. Thus, we need a way to reduce the support size from
at most (mn + 1) · p(m,n) to at most mn + 1. This is where the following beautiful result comes
in handy.
Proposition 3 (Gro¨tschel et al. [31]). There is a polynomial-time algorithm that, given a polytope
P with a strong separation oracle and a point y ∈ P, returns a representation of y as a convex
combination of dim(P) + 1 vertices of P.
We refer the reader to their work for formal definitions of a polytope, its dimension, and a strong
separation oracle. Let us describe in a bit more detail how we use this result. It is instructive to
revisit the first two iterations of Algorithm 1. Notice that at the end of the first iteration (t = 1),
the fractional partial allocation X1 consists of a polynomial number of integral allocations in its
support, i.e., X1 =
∑ℓ
k=1w
1,kA1,k, where ℓ = p(m,n) for some polynomial p. Consider the polytope
P1 formed by the convex hull of the integral allocations A1,1, . . . , A1,ℓ as follows:
P1 := {z : z =
∑
k
αkA
1,k where αk ≥ 0 for all k ∈ [ℓ] and
∑
k
αk = 1}.
Observe that P1 admits a polynomial-time strong separation oracle. That is, one can decide in
polynomial time whether a given point y ∈ Rn×m belongs to P1, or return a separating hyperplane
if it doesn’t (this can be done via linear programming). This implies that an (mn + 1)-sized
decomposition of X1, as guaranteed by Carathe´odory’s theorem, can be computed in polynomial
time.
Having computed an (mn + 1)-sized decomposition of X1, we now obtain at most mn + 1
subinstances in each of which we re-run our algorithm. Notice that doing so results in a probability
distribution over (mn+1) · p(m,n) deterministic allocations at the end of the second iteration. We
can now re-invoke the aforementioned algorithmic version of Carathe´odory’s theorem to once again
obtain a decomposition over at most mn+ 1 of these integral allocations in polynomial time. It is
easy to see that this argument in fact holds for all time steps via induction.
Notice that the randomized allocation thus produced has support that is a subset of the support
of the randomized allocation produced by recursive probabilistic serial. Hence, ex-post EF1 of this
modified procedure follows immediately from Lemma 1. Finally, it is also easy to verify that
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the randomized allocation is also ex-ante EF by essentially the same argument as in the proof of
Theorem 2: each individual step of the eating procedure produces an envy-free allocation, so even
if we change the convex combination over such allocations, it remains envy-free.
Again, like Recursive Probabilistic Serial (Algorithm 1), this algorithm takes only the ordinal
preferences of agents over goods as input; thus, it is in fact ex-ante SD-EF and ex-post SD-EF1.
4 Impossibility: Ex-ante Prop + ex-post EF1 + ex-post fPO
In the previous section, we showed that ex-ante EF and ex-post EF1 can be achieved simultaneously
in polynomial time. The obvious next question, then, is whether we can achieve stronger guarantees.
One property that our algorithms from Section 3 lack is efficiency. We defined three efficiency
notions in Section 2 that are related through the following logical implications: ex-ante PO ⇒
ex-post fPO ⇒ ex-post PO.
Let us consider adding the weakest of them: ex-post PO. Unfortunately, we were not able to
settle whether ex-ante EF (or even ex-ante Prop) is compatible with ex-post EF1 and ex-post
PO. The difficulty is that we do not understand the structure of integral EF1+PO allocations; we
elaborate on this issue in Section 8 and lay out several more open questions that stem from this.
Let us move on and consider imposing a slightly stronger efficiency notion: ex-post fPO. We
note that integral EF1+fPO allocations are known to always exist [10]. Hence, the question of
whether we can randomize over such allocations to achieve a desirable ex-ante fairness guarantee is
meaningful. However, in this case, we show that even achieving ex-ante proportionality is impossible
along with ex-post EF1 and ex-post fPO.
Theorem 3. There exists an instance with additive valuations in which no randomized allocation
is simultaneously ex-ante proportional, ex-post envy-free up to one good, and ex-post fractionally
Pareto optimal.
Proof. We present an instance in which the unique integral allocation satisfying EF1+fPO violates
proportionality. Specifically, consider an instance with two goods (g1, g2) and two agents (a1, a2)
whose additive valuations are as follows: v1,1 = 1, v1,2 = 2 and v2,1 = 1, v2,2 = 3. This instance
has exactly two integral EF1 allocations: A := ({g1}, {g2}) and B := ({g2}, {g1}). It is easy to
check that B is not fPO, since it is Pareto dominated by a fractional allocation X that assigns g1
completely to a1, and splits g2 equally between the two agents. Indeed, v1(X1) = v1(g1) + 0.5 ·
v1(g2) = 2 ≥ v1(B1) and v2(X2) = 0.5 · v2(g2) = 1.5 > v2(B2). To see why A is fPO, notice that
it assigns each good to an agent that has the highest valuation for it. Therefore, A maximizes the
utilitarian social welfare (i.e., sum of agents’ utilities) and is therefore fPO.
Finally, observe that A violates proportionality since v1(A1) = v1(g1) <
1
2v1(g1∪g2). Therefore,
any randomized allocation that is ex-post EF1+fPO must be supported entirely on the integral
allocation A, in which case it violates ex-ante Prop, as desired.
For example, since ex-ante envy-freeness and ex-ante group fairness imply ex-ante proportional-
ity, they are also incompatible with ex-post EF1+fPO. Similarly, since ex-ante PO implies ex-post
fPO (Proposition 1), we also get that ex-ante Prop+PO and ex-ante EF+PO are incompatible with
ex-post EF1.
We mentioned earlier that achieving ex-ante Prop or ex-ante EF along with ex-post EF1+PO
is an open question. Two prominent methods for finding an integral EF1+PO allocation are the
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integral MNW rule [19] and the market-based rule of Barman et al. [10]. An interesting implication
of Theorem 3 is that we cannot hope to achieve even ex-ante proportionality by randomizing over
allocations returned by either method. The latter method is guaranteed to return an integral
EF1+fPO allocation, so Theorem 3 directly applies. And the MNW rule, while only guaranteed to
return an integral EF1+PO allocation, uniquely returns allocation A in the example presented in
the proof of Theorem 3, which violates proportionality.
5 Possibility: Ex-ante GF + Ex-post Prop1 + Ex-Post EF11
Given the impossibility of ex-ante Prop and ex-post EF1+fPO derived in the previous section, it
is evident that retaining efficiency would require relaxing at least one of the fairness guarantees.
Ex-ante Prop is already a very weak fairness guarantee. So, in this section, we focus on relaxing
ex-post EF1. There are two relaxations that have been proposed in the literature — namely, Prop1
and EF11. We show that both of these can be achieved simultaneously, and in fact, this can be done
while strengthening ex-ante Prop and ex-post fPO to ex-ante GF. Recall that ex-ante GF implies
not only ex-ante Prop, but also ex-ante PO, which, by Proposition 1, implies ex-post fPO for any
implementation of it. In other words, our goal is to implement a fractional GF allocation using
integral Prop1+EF11 allocations.
Luckily, we know that a fractional GF allocation always exists. Conitzer et al. [22] argued
that a fractional MNW allocation satisfies group fairness. They did not provide a formal proof;
for completeness, we provide a proof of this result for the more general cake-cutting setting in
the appendix. Further, we know that a fractional MNW allocation can be computed in strongly
polynomial time [38, 46].
Hence, we ask whether a fractional MNW allocation can be implemented using integral Prop1+
EF11 allocations. Our starting point is a result by Budish et al. [18] that allows implementing
any fractional allocation using integral allocations that are very “close” to it in agent utilities.
Specifically, they prove the next result deriving and using an extension of the classic Birkhoff-von
Neumann theorem [12, 47].
Proposition 4 (Utility Guarantee; Theorem 9 of Budish et al. [18]). Given any fractional allocation
X, one can compute, in strongly polynomial time, a randomized allocation implementing X whose
support consists of integral allocations A1, . . . , Aℓ such that for every k ∈ [ℓ] and every agent i ∈ N ,
|vi(Xi)− vi(A
k
i )| ≤ max{vi(g) − vi(g
′) : 0 < Xi,g,Xi,g′ < 1 and g, g
′ ∈M}.
Notice that the upper bound established in Proposition 4 on how much agent i’s utility under
an integral allocation Ak in the support can differ from her utility under the fractional allocation
X depends only on the fractional allocation X. In contrast, the fairness guarantees we want to
establish for the integral allocations in the support — Prop1 and EF11 — consider what happens
when we add a good to the bundle of agent i that agent i is not already allocated ; in other words,
we need a stronger guarantee for integral allocations in the support which depends on which goods
the agent is (or is not) allocated ex-post.
It turns out that the method proposed by Budish et al. [18] already provides such a guarantee,
and their proof can be adapted to establish a more nuanced bound. Specifically, we show that if
the agent’s ex-ante utility vi(Xi) exceeds her ex-post utility vi(A
k
i ), then the gap is at most the
maximum value the agent has for any good that she lost in the integral allocation (i.e., any good
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g such that 0 < Xi,g < 1 and A
k
i,g = 0). Similarly, if the ex-post utility exceeds the ex-ante utility,
then the gap is at most the maximum value the agent has for any good that she gained in the
integral allocation (i.e., any good g such that 0 < Xi,g < 1 and A
k
i,g = 1). We later show that this
subtle improvement helps us establish the desired ex-post fairness guarantees.
Lemma 3 (Utility Guarantee++). Given a fractional allocation X, one can compute, in strongly
polynomial time, a randomized allocation implementing X whose support consists of integral allo-
cations A1, . . . , Aℓ such that for every k ∈ [ℓ] and every agent i ∈ N , the following hold:
1. If vi(A
k
i ) < vi(Xi), then ∃ g
−
i /∈ A
k
i with Xi,g−
i
> 0 such that vi(A
k
i ) + vi(g
−
i ) > vi(Xi).
2. If vi(A
k
i ) > vi(Xi), then ∃ g
+
i ∈ A
k
i with Xi,g+i
< 1 such that vi(A
k
i )− vi(g
+
i ) < vi(Xi).
Proof. In their proof of Proposition 4, Budish et al. [18] propose the following method for computing
an implementation of a given fractional allocation X. Consider a fixed agent i ∈ N . Suppose the
goods in M are indexed as gi,1, . . . , gi,m so that vi(gi,k) ≥ vi(gi,k+1) for each k ∈ [m − 1]. For
simplicity, we will write vi,k :− vi(gi,k) for all k ∈ [m] and vi,m+1 :− 0.
For any i ∈ N and any k ∈ [m], define Qi,k :=
∑k
t=1Xi,gi,t as the total fractional amount of the
k most preferred goods assigned to agent i under X. Consider the following set of constraints on
a generic fractional allocation Y :
H1 : ⌊Qi,k⌋ ≤
k∑
t=1
Yi,gi,t ≤ ⌈Qi,k⌉, ∀i ∈ N and ∀k ∈ [m],
H2 :
∑
i∈N
Yi,g = 1, ∀g ∈M.
(1)
Observe that X trivially satisfies these constraints. Budish et al. show that these constraints have
the so-called “bihierarchy” structure (refer to Appendix A for a formal definition), which allows
computing, in strongly polynomial time, an implementation of X whose support consists of integral
allocations A1, . . . , Aℓ that also satisfy these constraints.
Lastly, Budish et al. show that any integral allocation satisfying the constraints in Equation (1)
must satisfy the guarantee in Proposition 4. We show that it in fact satisfies the slightly stronger
guarantee that we seek. For simplicity, let us write Â to denote a generic integral allocation
satisfying the constraints in Equation (1), and Q̂i,k :=
∑k
t=1 Âi,gi,t for all i ∈ N and k ∈ [m].
Let us first analyze the case where vi(Âi) < vi(Xi). Then, there must exist some good g ∈ M
such that Âi,g < Xi,g. Since Âi,g ∈ {0, 1} and Xi,g ∈ [0, 1], this is equivalent to Âi,g = 0 < Xi,g.
Let k− be the smallest index such that Âi,g
i,k−
< Xi,g
i,k−
, i.e., gi,k− is agent i’s most preferred
good satisfying this condition. Hence, gi,k− /∈ Âi and Xi,gi,k− > 0. Further, for all k < k
−, we have
Âi,gi,k ≥ Xi,gi,k , and, as a result, Q̂i,k ≥ Qi,k. Thus,
vi(Xi)− vi(Âi) =
m∑
k=1
vi,k · (Xi,gi,k − Âi,gi,k) =
m∑
k=1
(vi,k − vi,k+1) · (Qi,k − Q̂i,k)
≤
m∑
k=k−
(vi,k − vi,k+1) · (Qi,k − Q̂i,k) <
m∑
k=k−
(vi,k − vi,k+1) · 1 = vi,k−,
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where the second transition is a simple algebraic exercise, the third transition holds because we
noted that Q̂i,k ≥ Qi,k for all k < k
−, and the fourth transition holds because Â satisfies H1 in
Equation (1), and therefore, we have that Qi,k − Q̂i,k ≤ Qi,k − ⌊Qi,k⌋ < 1. Taking g
−
i := gi,k−, we
notice that this is the guarantee we desire when vi(Âi) < vi(Xi).
Next, consider the other case where vi(Âi) > vi(Xi). Then, there must exist some good g ∈M
such that Âi,g > Xi,g. Note that this is equivalent to Âi,g = 1 > Xi,g. Let k
+ be the smallest
index such that gi,k+ satisfies this condition. Then, we have that gi,k+ ∈ Âi, Xi,gi,k+ < 1, and by
an argument similar to the one above, vi(Âi) − vi(Xi) < vi,k+. Hence, in this case, we can take
g+i := gi,k+, as desired.
We now show how Lemma 3 can be used to achieve our desired ex-post fairness guarantees of
Prop1 and EF11.
Theorem 4. There is a strongly polynomial-time algorithm that, given any fractional proportional
(Prop) allocation as input, computes an implementation of it using integral allocations that are
proportional up to one good (Prop1). If, in addition, the input is a fractional MNW allocation,
then the integral allocations in the support also satisfy envy-freeness up to one good more-and-less
(EF11).
Proof. Let X be a fractional allocation, and let A1, . . . , Aℓ be integral allocations in the support of
an implementation of X produced by Lemma 3.
Suppose X satisfies proportionality. We want to show that for each k ∈ [ℓ], Ak is Prop1. Since
X is proportional, for every i ∈ N , vi(Xi) ≥ vi(~1
m)/n, where vi(~1
m) is agent i’s utility for receiving
all goods fully. Fix k ∈ [ℓ]. By Lemma 3, we have that for every agent i ∈ N , either vi(A
k
i ) ≥
vi(Xi) ≥ vi(~1
m)/n, or there exists a good g /∈ Aki such that vi(A
k
i ) + vi(g) > vi(Xi) ≥ vi(~1
m)/n.
Therefore, Ak is Prop1.
Next, suppose thatX maximizes the Nash social welfare among all fractional allocations. Since a
fractional MNW allocation is certainly proportional [45], the aforementioned argument still applies
for ex-post Prop1. We show that in this case, Ak is also EF11 for each k ∈ [ℓ]. Note that since X
is a fractional MNW allocation, the following condition is satisfied for any pair of agents i, h ∈ N
and any good g ∈M :4
Xi,g > 0 =⇒
vi(g)
vi(Xi)
≥
vh(g)
vh(Xh)
. (2)
Fix a pair of distinct agents i, h ∈ N . By Lemma 3, either vi(A
k
i ) ≤ vi(Xi), or there exists
g+i ∈ A
k
i with Xi,g+i
< 1 such that vi(A
k
i \ {g
+
i }) < vi(Xi). Similarly, either vh(A
k
h) ≥ vh(Xh), or
there exists g−h /∈ A
k
h with Xh,g−
h
> 0 such that vh(A
k
h ∪ {g
−
h }) > vh(Xh). To simplify the analysis,
let us assume that the second condition holds in both cases.5
By summing the right-hand side inequality in Equation (2) over all g ∈ Aki \ {g
+
i }, we get
vh(A
k
i \ {g
+
i })
vh(Xh)
≤
vi(A
k
i \ {g
+
i })
vi(Xi)
< 1.
Thus, vh(A
k
i \ {g
+
i }) < vh(Xh) < vh(A
k
h ∪ {g
−
h }), implying that A
k satisfies EF11, as desired.
4The condition that transferring an arbitrarily small fraction of good g from agent i to agent h does not increase
Nash welfare reduces to this condition.
5If vi(A
k
i ) ≤ vi(Xi) (or vh(A
k
h) ≥ vh(Xh)), we can treat g
+
i (or g
−
h ) as a dummy good with vi(g
+
i ) = 0 (or
vh(g
−
h ) = 0).
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Notice that the proof of Theorem 4 establishes a stronger version of Prop1 wherein an agent
not receiving her proportional share gets strictly more than her proportional share by receiving one
additional good. Similarly, it also establishes a stronger version of EF11 wherein an agent envying
another agent would strictly prefer her own allocation over the other agent’s allocation after adding
one missing good to her bundle and removing one good from the other agent’s bundle.
Barman and Krishnamurthy [9] recently established that integral Prop1+EF11+fPO allocations
exist and can be computed in strongly polynomial time. They rely on special-purpose techniques
for rounding a fractional MNW allocation. By constrast, Theorem 4 uses a standard technique to
round a fractional MNW allocation, computes not just one integral Prop1+EF11+fPO allocation
but rather an implementation of the fractional MNW allocation over such integral allocations, and
can be applied to any fractional Prop+PO allocation to implement it using integral Prop1+fPO
allocations.6
The reason we use a fractional MNW allocation in Theorem 4 is because it is known to be
group fair (GF). This observation, the fact that a fractional MNW allocation can be computed in
strongly polynomial time [38, 46], and Theorem 4 immediately yield the main result of this section.
Corollary 1. There exists a randomized allocation that is ex-ante group fair (GF), ex-post propor-
tional up to one good (Prop1), and ex-post envy-free up to one good more-and-less (EF11). Further,
it can be computed in strongly polynomial time.
6 Characterizing MNW
To prove Corollary 1, we utilized a rounding of a fractional MNW allocation because it is known
to be group fair. One may wonder whether it is possible to use any other fractional allocation
as the basis for this result. In this section, we answer this negatively by showing a fundamental
connection between group fairness and the MNW allocation rule. In particular, we show that
MNW, or refinements thereof, is the only allocation rule that satisfies group fairness together with
replication invariance, which states that the set of allocations returned by an allocation rule should
not substantively change if the input is replicated.
6.1 Replication Invariance
Replication invariance has also been well-explored in economic literature on resource allocation.
Intuitively, it says that if we take an instance I and duplicate it to form k copies, the output on
the duplicated instance contains the duplicate of each possible allocation on the original instance.
Recall that an allocation rule outputs a set of (tied) allocations given an instance of the fair division
problem. Formally, given an instance I = (N,M, (vi)i∈N ) and a positive integer k ∈ N, let kI denote
an instance in which each agent and good is replicated k times. For an allocation A on I, let kA
denote the allocation on kI in which every copy of agent i ∈ N receives allocation Ai.
Definition 11 (Replication Invariance). An allocation rule f satisfies replication invariance if, for
every instance I ∈ I, and every allocation A ∈ f(I), kA ∈ f(kI).
We remarked in Section 1.2 that replication invariance works quite well with strictly convex
preferences, which is the domain in which many of the early characterization results of the MNW
6Recall that since a fractional MNW allocation is Pareto optimal, any allocation in the support of an implemen-
tation of it must be fPO by Proposition 1.
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rule hold. As just one example, note that under strictly convex utilities, any fractional envy-
free and Pareto optimal allocation must produce identical allocations to two agents with identical
valuations, as observed by Varian [45]. To see this, suppose for contradiction that agents i and j
have identical valuation v but receive different allocations Ai and Aj . Then, envy-freeness implies
that v(Ai) = v(Aj). Now, by strong convexity, v((Ai+Aj)/2) > v(Ai) = v(Aj). Hence, allocation A
violates fractional Pareto optimality because giving each of agents i and j the allocation (Ai+Aj)/2
would make them both strictly happier. This property comes in handy when dealing with replication
because we know that all replicas of an agent must receive identical allocations. In contrast, this
property does not hold for additive utilities. For example, if two agents equally like two goods,
giving one good fully to one agent and the other good fully to the other agent violates this property
and is yet envy-free and Pareto optimal.
6.2 Group Fairness and Replication Invariance Characterize MNW
We have remarked that MNW satisfies group fairness. We begin this section by showing that
the fractional MNW rule (which returns the set of all fractional MNW allocations) also satisfies
replication invariance.
Proposition 5. The fractional MNW rule satisfies replication invariance.
Proof. Suppose that it violates replication invariance. That is, for some instance I = (N,M, (vi)i∈N )
and k ∈ N, there exists a fractional allocation Y ∈ MNW(I) = argmaxX∈X
∏
i∈N vi(Xi) such that
kY 6∈ MNW(kI). For an agent i ∈ N and ℓ ∈ [k], let iℓ denote the ℓ
th copy of agent i in the
replicated instance kI. Then, there exists an allocation Z on kI such that
Πi∈NΠ
k
ℓ=1vi(Ziℓ) > Πi∈NΠ
k
ℓ=1vi(Yi).
For every i ∈ N and ℓ ∈ [k], let Z ′iℓ := Z
′
i :=
∑k
ℓ′=1
Zi
ℓ′
k . That is, Z
′ takes the total allocation to
all copies of i and distributes it evenly across the copies so that each copy of agent i receives Z ′i.
Because valuations are additive and each copy of i has the same valuation function, it can be seen
that the Nash Welfare of Z ′ is at least as large as that of Z. That is,
Πi∈NΠ
k
ℓ=1vi(Z
′
i) ≥ Πi∈NΠ
k
ℓ=1vi(Ziℓ) > Πi∈NΠ
k
ℓ=1vi(Yi)⇒ Πi∈Nvi(Z
′
i) > Πi∈Nvi(Yi),
which contradicts the fact that Y ∈MNW (I).
We next show that MNW is in fact characterized by group fairness and replication invariance,
in the sense that any allocation rule that sometimes produces an allocation that does not maximize
the product of valuations necessarily violates either group fairness or replication invariance.
Theorem 5. Any allocation rule that satisfies group fairness and replication invariance is a re-
finement of the fractional MNW rule.
Before proving Theorem 5, we show a technical lemma that will be helpful.
Lemma 4. For every instance I, and every Pareto optimal allocation A 6∈ MNW(I), there exists
a pair of agents i, j and X ⊆ Ai with vi(X) ∈ (0, vi(Ai)) and vj(X) > 0, such that
vj(X) > vj(Aj) ·
vi(X)
vi(Ai \X)
. (3)
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Proof. Let Z ∈ MNW(I) and let U = {i ∈ N : vi(Ai) > vi(Zi)} be the set of agents with more
utility in allocation A than in Z. First, we claim that there exist agents i ∈ U and j 6∈ U with
Ai ∩ Zj 6= ∅. If this were not the case, then ∪i∈UAi = ∪i∈UZi. Further, since A /∈ MNW(I), there
exists an agent h with vh(Ah) 6= vh(Zh). And since A is Pareto optimal, we must have that U 6= ∅.
Hence, the allocation B with Bi = Ai for every i ∈ U and Bi = Zi for every i 6∈ U has strictly
higher Nash welfare than Z, a contradiction.
Fix agents i ∈ U and j /∈ U such that Ai ∩ Zj 6= ∅. Let X = ǫ · (Ai ∩ Zj), where ǫ > 0 is small
enough that
vi(Ai \X)
vi(Zi)
>
vj(Aj)
vj(Zj \X)
, vi(X) ∈ (0, vi(Ai)), and vj(X) ∈ (0, vj(Zj)). (4)
It is possible to choose such an ǫ because the first inequality in Equation (4) holds for ǫ = 0 and
both sides are continuous in ǫ. Further, we know that vi(X) > 0 by Pareto optimality of A, and
that vj(X) > 0 by Pareto optimality of Z.
We also know, by the definition of a fractional MNW allocation, that
vj(X)
vj(Zj \X)
≥
vi(X)
vi(Zi)
. (5)
Multiplying the left and right hand sides of the inequalities in Equations (4) and (5) gives the
desired result.
Proof of Theorem 5. Let f be an allocation rule, and suppose that there exists an instance I for
which there exists an allocation A ∈ f(I) but A 6∈ MNW(I). If A is not Pareto optimal then it
violates group fairness. So suppose A is Pareto optimal. We will show that if it satisfies replication
invariance, then it must violate group fairness.
By Lemma 4, there exist agents i, j and X ⊆ Ai with vi(X) ∈ (0, vi(Ai)) and vj(X) > 0 such
that
vj(X) > vj(Aj) ·
vi(X)
vi(Ai \X)
.
Further, suppose that vi(Ai\X)vi(X) is an integer. This is WLOG because we can just take the set of
goods X and scale them down until we get an integer. Equation (3) is preserved under this scaling
due to additive valuations.
Let k = vi(Ai\X)vi(X) ∈ N and consider the replicated instance kI. Denote the copies of agent i in
instance kI by i1, . . . , ik. By replication invariance, kA ∈ f(kI). We show that kA does not satisfy
group fairness. Let S consist of all k copies of i and a single copy of j, and T consist of all k copies
of i. For every ℓ ∈ [k], let Biℓ = Aiℓ \Xℓ, where Xℓ is a copy of X, and let Bj = X1 ∪ . . .∪Xk. For
every copy iℓ of agent i, we have
|S|
|T |
· viℓ(Biℓ) =
|S|
|T |
· viℓ(Aiℓ \Xk) =
vi(Ai\X)
vi(X)
+ 1
vi(Ai\X)
vi(X)
vi(Ai \X) = vi(Ai \X) + vi(X) = vi(Ai)
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and for the single copy of j, we have
|S|
|T |
· vj(Bj) =
|S|
|T |
· k · vj(X) =
vi(Ai\X)
vi(X)
+ 1
vi(Ai\X)
vi(X)
·
vi(Ai \X)
vi(X)
· vj(X)
=
vi(Ai)
vi(X)
· vj(X) >
vi(Ai \X)
vi(X)
vj(X) > vj(Aj),
where the final inequality follows from Equation (3). Group fairness is violated.
We explore this characterization further in the appendix. In particular, we investigate the
implications of relaxing or strengthening group fairness. We show that Theorem 5 ceases to hold
even under a relatively mild relaxation of group fairness. We also show that if group fairness is
strengthened to fractional group fairness, which extends group fairness to allow groups that consist
of fractions of agents, then Theorem 5 holds even without requiring replication invariance.
7 The Case of Bads
In this section, we consider the case where we are dividing bads instead of goods. We show that
our positive results from Sections 3 and 5 still apply in this setting.
Formally, let M be a set of m bads. Fractional, integral, and randomized allocations are defined
as in the case of goods. However, the agents now have non-positive valuation functions, i.e., vi,b ≤ 0
for all agents i ∈ N and bads b ∈M . The definitions of proportionality, envy-freeness, (fractional)
Pareto optimality, and group fairness are unchanged from the goods case. However, the definitions
of approximate fairness need to be modified. Crucially, when assessing whether an allocation is
approximately fair from the perspective of agent i, we often remove a bad from (rather than add
a good to) i’s bundle and/or add a bad to (rather than remove a good from) some other agent j’s
bundle. This causes the relaxations to differ from their goods counterparts significantly.
Definition 12 (Proportionality Up To One Bad (Prop1)). An integral allocation A is proportional
up to one bad if for every agent i ∈ N , either vi(Ai) ≥ vi(~1
m)/n or there exists a bad j ∈ Ai such
that vi(Ai \ {j}) ≥ vi(~1
m)/n, where vi(~1
m) is agent i’s valuation for receiving all bads fully.
Definition 13 (Envy-Freeness Up To k Bads (EFk)). An integral allocation A is envy-free up
to k bads if for every pair of agents i, h ∈ N , there exists Si ⊆ Ai with |Si| ≤ k such that
vi(Ai \ Si) ≥ vi(Ah).
Definition 14 (Envy-Freeness Up To One Bad More-and-Less (EF11) [9]). An integral allocation
A is envy-free up to one bad more-and-less if for every pair of agents i, h ∈ N such that Ai 6= ∅, we
have vi(Ai \ {ji}) ≥ vi(Ah ∪ {jh}) for some bads ji ∈ Ai and jh /∈ Ah.
Finally, for the case of bads, there is no known equivalent of the MNW allocation rule. For
example, it is known that maximizing or minimizing the product of valuations (or the product of
absolute valuations) leads to dramatically unfair outcomes. However, fractional CEEI allocations
are still known to exist; we refer an interested reader to the work of Bogomolnaia et al. [14]. It is
easy to show, as in the case of goods, that these allocations must be group fair (GF). We do not
need to introduce the definition of CEEI for bads; we only need the following property, observed
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by Bogomolnaia et al. [14, Lemma 6]. If X is a fractional CEEI allocation of bads, then vi(Xi) < 0
for all agents i ∈ N ,7 and for all agents i, h ∈ N and bads j ∈M ,
Xi,j > 0⇒
vi,j
vi(Xi)
≤
vh,j
vh(Xh)
. (6)
Note that the quantities on both sides of the inequality are non-negative. This property is
similar to that of CEEI allocations for goods that we used in the proof of Theorem 8.
7.1 Ex-ante EF + Ex-post EF1 for Bads
Note that our algorithms from Section 3 — recursive probabilistic serial (RPS) and its polynomial-
time variant — only use ordinal preferences of agents over goods. Hence, these algorithms naturally
extend to the case of bads: Given an agent’s valuation function over bads, we can construct an
ordinal preference over bads in which the bads are sorted in a non-increasing order of the agent’s
valuation for them.
One might wonder how the guarantees that our algorithms provide for goods translate to the
case of bads. While the ex-ante EF guarantee carries over, unfortunately the ex-post EF1 guarantee
enjoyed by our algorithms in the case of goods does not directly translate to the case of bads. To
see this, consider an instance with two agents 1, 2 and three bads b1, b2, b3 such that vi(bj) = −j
for all i ∈ [2] and j ∈ [3]. That is, all agents strictly prefer bad b1 to b2 and b2 to b3. In the first
step, the agents start eating b1 simultaneously, eat half of b1 each, then move onto b2, and eat half
of b2 each. Consider an integral allocation in which b1 is allocated to agent 1 and b2 is allocated
to agent 2. In the second step, each agent eats half of b3. At this point, our algorithm will, with
probability 1/2, allocate b3 to agent 2. This will result in an integral allocation A in the support
where A1 = {b1}, and A2 = {b2, b3}. It is easy to check that agent 2 continues to envy agent 1
even if we remove any one bad from agent 2’s bundle. Removing two bads from agent 2’s bundle
removes the envy, however. Hence, this allocation is EF2, but not EF1. In fact, we show that both
RPS and its polynomial-time variant are always ex-post EF2 for bads.
Proposition 6. For additive valuation functions over bads, recursive probabilistic serial (RPS)
and its polynomial-time variant from Section 3.2 produce randomized allocations that are ex-ante
envy-free (EF) and ex-post envy-free up to two bads (EF2).
Proof Sketch. The reason why the randomized allocation produced by both algorithms is ex-ante
EF is the same as in the case of goods. In each step t, the fractional allocation Xt produced by the
Eating procedure is envy-free because agents are forced to eat bads at the same rate and an agent
is always eating a bad that she prefers the most among all bads not fully consumed. Since each Xt is
envy-free, a probability distribution over all Xt-s in different branches is also envy-free. Hence, the
expected fractional allocation induced in step t is envy-free for each t. Hence, the overall fractional
allocation, which is the sum of fractional allocations induced in all rounds, is also envy-free.
For ex-post EF2, let A be an integral allocation produced by RPS (or its polynomial-time
variant). We notice that Lemma 1 still holds for the case of bads. That is, for t < ⌈m/n⌉, if
bi,t denotes the bad allocated to agent i in iteration t, then agent i (weakly) prefers bi,t to all
bads in M t+1 (bads unallocated after t iterations of the algorithm). Now, when t < ⌊m/n⌋, we
7This assumes that each agent has a strictly negative value for at least one bad. If an agent has zero value for all
bads, we can effectively remove her from the instance.
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know that another agent h must receive a bad in round t + 1 ≤ ⌊m/n⌋. Hence, for all agents
i, h ∈ N and all t < ⌊m/n⌋, we have vi(bi,t) ≥ vi(bh,t+1). Summing over t < ⌊m/n⌋, we get
vi({bi,t : 1 ≤ t < ⌊m/n⌋}) ≥ vi({bh,t : 2 ≤ t ≤ ⌊m/n⌋}) ≥ vi(Ah). Note that in the LHS, there are
at most two bads missing from Ai: the bad allocated to agent i in round ⌊m/n⌋, and a bad which
may be allocated to agent i in the final round ⌈m/n⌉. Hence, we have that vi(Ai \Si) ≥ vi(Ah) for
some Si ⊆ Ai with |Si| ≤ 2.
Once again, note that because these algorithms only take the ordinal preferences as input, they
in fact guarantee ex-ante SD-EF + ex-post SD-EF2 (which can be defined similarly to SD-EF1
using the SD preference relation).
It is natural to ask whether this is the best we can do. Note that in the proof of Proposition 6,
an “up to two bads” relaxation was required because the envying agent may receive an extra bad
compared to the envied agent (⌈m/n⌉ bads as opposed to ⌊m/n⌋ bads). However, when m is a
multiple of n, it turns out that the allocation is in fact ex-post EF1, as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 5. For additive valuation functions over bads, recursive probabilistic serial and its polynomial-
time variant from Section 3.2 produce randomized allocations that are ex-ante envy-free (EF) and
ex-post envy-free up to one bad (EF1) whenever the number of bads is divisible by the number of
agents.
Proof. Envy-freeness follows directly from Proposition 6. For EF1, note that the exact same rea-
soning as in the proof of Proposition 6 applies, and we have vi({bi,t : 1 ≤ t < ⌊m/n⌋}) ≥ vi({bh,t :
2 ≤ t ≤ ⌊m/n⌋}) ≥ vi(Ah) for every pair of agents i, h ∈ N . However, since n divides m, we are
guaranteed that there is only one bad missing from the LHS, which is that allocated to agent i in
round ⌊m/n⌋ = m/n. Hence, we have vi(Ai \ bi,m/n) ≥ vi(Ah).
What about the case where m is not a multiple of n? It turns out that a simple modification
of RPS (or its polynomial-time variant) works. One can simply add a number of dummy bads
(which all agents value at 0) such that the total number of bads becomes divisible by the number
of agents n, then use RPS or its polynomial-time variant to compute an ex-ante EF + ex-post EF1
allocation (Lemma 5), and finally remove the dummy bads from the computed allocation, which
does not affect its fairness guarantees. This yields the following result.
Theorem 6. For additive valuation functions over bads, a randomized allocation that is ex-ante
envy-free (EF) and ex-post envy-free up to one bad (EF1) always exists, and can be computed in
strongly polynomial time.
The case of mixed manna. Let us briefly examine the mixed manna setting in which we need
to allocate items, and each item can be either a good or a bad for each agent. We generically denote
an item by o. That is, for each agent i ∈ N and item o ∈M , we only require that vi,j ∈ R.
Envy-freeness up to one item can be generalized to the mixed manna setting. It requires that
if agent i envies agent h, then the envy can be eliminated by either removing one item from agent
h’s bundle (which must be a good for i), or one item from agent i’s bundle (which must be a bad
for i).
Definition 15 (Envy-Freeness Up To One Item (EF1) [8]). An integral allocation A is envy-free
up to one item if for every pair of agents i, h ∈ N , either i does not envy h (i.e., vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Ah)),
or there exists an item o ∈ Ai ∪Ah such that vi(Ai \ {o}) ≥ vi(Ah \ {o}).
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It is easy to check that when the instance consists of only goods or only bads, this definition
reduces to the EF1 definitions we previously introduced. However, our algorithms achieve a re-
laxation of this, which we call weak envy-freeness up to one item (w-EF1), that allows both the
removal of an item from agent h’s bundle and an item from agent i’s bundle. Note that when the
instance consists of only goods or only bads, w-EF1 still reduces to the standard EF1 definition.
Definition 16 (Weak Envy-Freeness Up to One Item (w-EF1)). An integral allocation A is weak
envy-free up to one item if for every pair of agents i, h ∈ N , either i does not envy h (i.e., vi(Ai) ≥
vi(Ah)), or there exists a good oh ∈ Ah and/or a bad oi ∈ Ai such that vi(Ai \{oi}) ≥ vi(Ah \{oh}).
While we were unable to settle the existence of an ex-ante EF + ex-post EF1 allocation for the
mixed manna setting, we are able to guarantee ex-ante EF + ex-post w-EF1.
Theorem 7. For additive valuation functions in the mixed manna setting, a randomized allocation
that is ex-ante envy-free (EF) and ex-post weak envy-free up to one item (w-EF1) always exists,
and can be computed in strongly polynomial time.
Proof Sketch. Once again, we add dummy items (which all agents value at 0) to guarantee that m
is an integer multiple of n, and remove them at the end. When we run RPS (or its polynomial-
time variant), we can again apply the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 6 to obtain
vi({oi,t : 1 ≤ t < m/n}) ≥ vi({oh,t : 2 ≤ t ≤ m/n}). That is, vi(Ai \ {oi,m/n}) ≥ vi(Ah \ {oh,1}),
which is the desired ex-post w-EF1 guarantee. Ex-ante EF follows with the same reasoning as
before.
Since our algorithms only take the ordinal preferences of agents over items as input, this in fact
guarantees ex-ante SD-EF and ex-post SD-w-EF1 (which can be defined similarly to SD-EF1 using
the SD preference relation).
Finally, we note that the techniques from this section can also be applied to the decomposition
of probabilistic serial (PS) achieved in the subsequent work of Aziz [7] to obtain an ex-ante SD-EF
and ex-post SD-w-EF1 allocation of mixed manna that retains additional axiomatic properties of
PS.
7.2 Ex-ante GF + Ex-post Prop1 + Ex-post EF11 for Bads
We now show that our main result from Section 5 for the case of goods carries over easily to the
case of bads. This is somewhat striking because it has been observed that many results for the case
of goods do not easily carry over to the case of bads [14]. For example, while it is known that a
competitive equilibrium with equal incomes (CEEI) fractional allocation exists for the case of bads,
and such an allocation is envy-free and Pareto optimal, it is no longer obtained by maximizing
or minimizing the product of (dis)utilities, and whether such an allocation can be computed in
polynomial time is a major open question [16, 29]. However, if such an allocation is given, Braˆnzei
and Sandomirskiy [16] show that one can round it to obtain an integral Prop1+EF11+fPO allocation
in strongly polynomial time.
Interestingly, we do not need to re-prove the utility guarantee (Lemma 3) for the case of bads.
Instead, we can simply reduce the case of bads to the case of goods by considering a modified
valuation function v̂i = −vi (thus guaranteeing v̂i ≥ 0), and since Lemma 3 bounds the difference
between the utility of an agent in an integral allocation and her utility in the original fractional
allocation from both below and above, this guarantee remains useful for the case of bads. We then
show that this guarantee is sufficient to establish Prop1 and EF11 in the case of bads as well.
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Theorem 8. For additive valuation functions over bads, there is a strongly polynomial-time algo-
rithm that, given any fractional proportional (Prop) allocation as input, computes an implementa-
tion of it using integral allocations that are proportional up to one bad (Prop1). If, in addition,
the input is a fractional CEEI allocation, then the integral allocations in the support also satisfy
envy-freeness up to one bad more-and-less (EF11).
Proof. Given an instance I = (N,M, (vi)i∈N ) of bad division, let us define the corresponding
instance of good division as Î = (N,M, (v̂i)i∈N ) of good division, where v̂i = −vi. Given a
fractional allocation X of I, we treat it as an allocation of instance Î, and apply Lemma 3 to
find an implementation of X. Let A1, . . . , Aℓ be integral allocations in its support. Note that the
‘reduction’ to goods is used only for the decomposition step, and not for constructing the relevant
fractional allocation.
First, suppose X is Prop under I. We want to show that for each k ∈ [ℓ], Ak is Prop1 under
I. Since X is proportional, for every i ∈ N , v̂i(Xi) ≤ v̂i(~1
m)/n, where v̂i(~1
m) is agent i’s valuation
for receiving all “goods” fully. Fix k ∈ [ℓ]. By Lemma 3, we have that for every agent i ∈ N ,
either v̂i(A
k
i ) ≤ v̂i(Xi) ≤ v̂i(~1
m)/n, or there exists a bad j ∈ Aki such that v̂i(A
k
i )− v̂i,j < v̂i(Xi) ≤
v̂i(~1
m)/n. Therefore, Ak is Prop1 under I. Note that here, we are using the second part of Lemma 3,
whereas in the goods case, we used the first part to establish Prop1.
Next, suppose that X is a fractional CEEI allocation under I. Since this allocation is envy-
free [14], and therefore proportional, the aforementioned argument still applies for ex-post Prop1
under I. We show that in this case, Ak is also EF11 under I for each k ∈ [ℓ]. As mentioned before,
since X is a fractional CEEI allocation under I, Equation (6) holds. Fix a pair of distinct agents
i, h ∈ N . By Lemma 3, either v̂i(A
k
i ) ≥ v̂i(Xi), or there exists b
−
i /∈ A
k
i with Xi,b−
i
> 0 such that
v̂i(A
k
i ∪ {b
−
i }) > v̂i(Xi). Similarly, either v̂h(A
k
h) ≤ v̂h(Xh), or there exists b
+
h ∈ A
k
h with Xh,b−
h
< 1
such that v̂h(A
k
h \ {b
+
h }) < v̂h(Xh). To simplify the analysis like in the case of goods, let us assume
that the second condition holds in both cases.
By summing the right-hand side inequality in Equation (6) over all b ∈ Aki ∪ {b
−
i }, we get
v̂h(A
k
i ∪ {b
−
i })
v̂h(Xh)
≥
v̂i(A
k
i ∪ {b
−
i })
v̂i(Xi)
> 1.
Thus, v̂h(A
k
i ∪ {b
−
i }) > v̂h(Xh) > v̂h(A
k
h \ {b
+
h }), implying that vh(A
k
i ∪ {b
−
i }) < vh(Xh) < vh(A
k
h \
{b+h }), and A
k satisfies EF11, as desired.
Corollary 2. For additive valuation functions over bads, there exists a randomized allocation that
is ex-ante group fair (GF), ex-post proportional up to one bad (Prop1), and ex-post envy-free up
to one bad more-and-less (EF11). Further, it can be computed in strongly polynomial time given a
fractional CEEI allocation.
We note that in Corollary 2, unlike in the case of goods, we have to add the condition “given a
fractional CEEI allocation”. This is because a fractional CEEI allocation is known to be computable
in strongly polynomial time in the case of goods, but this remains an interesting open question in
the case of bads [16, 29].
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8 Discussion
Perhaps the most fascinating open question that stems from our work is whether ex-ante envy-
freeness (or even ex-ante proportionality) is compatible with ex-post EF1 and ex-post PO.8
Open Question: Does there always exist a randomized allocation that is ex-ante EF, ex-post EF1,
and ex-post PO? What about ex-ante Prop, ex-post EF1, and ex-post PO?
The difficulty in approaching this question is that there are very few available methods of finding
integral EF1+PO allocations [19, 10], so finding many such allocations and randomizing over them
is tricky. Also, unlike the set of integral EF1 allocations, which we somewhat understand, not
much is known about the set of integral EF1+PO allocations other than the fact that it is always
non-empty. For example, round-robin method allows us to control exactly which agents might
envy which other agents in addition to obtaining EF1. The following questions, which thus resolve
positively for EF1, are open for EF1+PO to the best of our knowledge.
Open Question: Given agents i and j, does there always exist an integral EF1+PO allocation in
which agent i does not envy agent j? What about an integral EF1+PO allocation in which agent i
does not envy any other agent? Given a priority ordering over the agents, does there always exist
an EF1+PO allocation in which no agent envies an agent with lower priority?
Various other open problems remain. For instance, other related notions such as envy-freeness
up to any good (EFX) and approximate maximin-share guarantee (MMS) are natural candidates
for ex-post fairness.9 More broadly, the next step would be to achieve ex-ante and ex-post fairness
guarantees simultaneously in a variety of other problems such as voting, matching, and public
decision-making.
References
[1] A. Abdulkadirog˘lu and T. So¨nmez. Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random
Endowments in House Allocation Problems. Econometrica, 66(3):689–701, 1998.
[2] M. Akbarpour and A. Nikzad. Approximate Random Allocation Mechanisms. The Review of
Economic Studies, 2020. ISSN 0034-6527. doi: 10.1093/restud/rdz066.
[3] M. Aleksandrov, H. Aziz, S. Gaspers, and T. Walsh. Online Fair Division: Analysing a
Food Bank Problem. In Proceedings of the 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 2540–2546, 2015.
[4] K. J. Arrow and M.D. Intriligator, editors. Handbook of Mathematical Economics. North-
Holland, 1982.
[5] H. Aziz. A Probabilistic Approach to Voting, Allocation, Matching, and Coalition Formation.
In The Future of Economic Design, pages 45–50. Springer, 2019.
8While our simulations did not find a counterexample, simulations have been known to be misleading for existential
results in the past, e.g., in case of the (non)existence of MMS allocations [34].
9For additive valuations, whether an integral EFX allocation always exists is an open problem, and while integral
MMS allocations do not always exist [34], 3/4-approximate MMS allocations are known to always exist [30, 28].
25
[6] H. Aziz and C. Ye. Cake Cutting Algorithms for Piecewise Constant and Piecewise Uniform
Valuations. In Proceedings of the 10th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE),
pages 1–14, 2014.
[7] Haris Aziz. Simultaneously Achieving Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Fairness. arXiv preprint
arXiv:2004.02554, 2020.
[8] Haris Aziz, Ioannis Caragiannis, Ayumi Igarashi, and Toby Walsh. Fair Allocation of Indivisi-
ble Goods and Chores. In Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 53–59, 2019.
[9] S. Barman and S.K. Krishnamurthy. On the Proximity of Markets with Integral Equilibria. In
Proceedings of the 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 1748–1755,
2019.
[10] S. Barman, S. K. Krishnamurthy, and R. Vaish. Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations. In
Proceedings of the 19th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), pages 557–
574, 2018.
[11] M. Berliant, W. Thomson, and K. Dunz. On the Fair Division of a Heterogeneous Commodity.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 21(3):201–216, 1992.
[12] G. Birkhoff. Three Observations on Linear Algebra. Universidad Nacional de Tucuma´n,
Revista A, 5:147–151, 1946.
[13] A. Bogomolnaia and H. Moulin. A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem. Journal
of Economic Theory, 100:295–328, 2001.
[14] A. Bogomolnaia, H. Moulin, F. Sandomirskiy, and E. Yanovskaya. Competitive Division of a
Mixed Manna. Econometrica, pages 1847–1871, 2017.
[15] S. Bouveret, Y. Chevaleyre, N. Maudet, and H. Moulin. Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods,
pages 284–310. Cambridge University Press, 2016.
[16] S. Braˆnzei and F. Sandomirskiy. Algorithms for Competitive Division of Chores. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1907.01766, 2019.
[17] E. Budish. The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium
from Equal Incomes. Journal of Political Economy, 119(6):1061–1103, 2011.
[18] E. Budish, Y.-K. Che, F. Kojima, and P. Milgrom. Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms:
Theory and Applications. American Economic Review, 103(2):585–623, 2013.
[19] I. Caragiannis, D. Kurokawa, H. Moulin, A.D. Procaccia, N. Shah, and J. Wang. The Unreason-
able Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
(TEAC), 7(3):1–32, 2019.
[20] Y. Chen and T. So¨nmez. Improving Efficiency of On-Campus Housing: An Experimental
Study. American Economic Review, 92(5):1669–1686, 2002.
26
[21] V. Conitzer, R. Freeman, and N. Shah. Fair Public Decision Making. In Proceedings of the
18th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), pages 629–646, 2017.
[22] V. Conitzer, R. Freeman, N. Shah, and J.W. Vaughan. Group Fairness for the Allocation
of Indivisible Goods. In Proceedings of the 33rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI), pages 1853–1860, 2019.
[23] S. Corbett-Davies, E. Pierson, A. Feller, S. Goel, and A. Huq. Algorithmic Decision Making
and the Cost of Fairness. In Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Knowledge
Discovery and Data Mining (KDD), pages 797–806, 2017.
[24] G. Debreu and H. Scarf. A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy. International Economic
Review, 4(3):235–246, 1963.
[25] Edmund Eisenberg and David Gale. Consensus of Subjective Probabilities: The Pari-Mutuel
Method. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 30(1):165–168, 1959.
[26] D. Foley. Resource Allocation and the Public Sector. Yale Economics Essays, 7:45–98, 1967.
[27] T. Gajdos and J. Tallon. Fairness under Uncertainty. Economics Bulletin, 4(18):1–7, 2002.
[28] J. Garg and S. Taki. An Improved Approximation Algorithm for Maximin Shares. In Proceed-
ings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), 2020. Forthcoming.
[29] Jugal Garg and Peter McGlaughlin. Computing Competitive Equilibria with Mixed Manna.
In Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent
Systems (AAMAS), pages 420–428, 2020.
[30] M. Ghodsi, M. HajiAghayi, M. Seddighin, S. Seddighin, and H. Yami. Fair Allocation of Indi-
visible Goods: Improvements and Generalizations. In Proceedings of the 19th ACM Conference
on Economics and Computation (EC), pages 539–556, 2018.
[31] M. Gro¨tschel, L. Lova´sz, and A. Schrijver. The Ellipsoid Method and its Consequences in
Combinatorial Optimization. Combinatorica, 1(2):169–197, 1981.
[32] A. Hylland and R. Zeckhauser. The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions. The
Journal of Political Economy, 87(2):293–314, 1979.
[33] M. Kaneko and K. Nakamura. The Nash Social Welfare Function. Econometrica, 47(2):423–
435, 1979.
[34] D. Kurokawa, A.D. Procaccia, and J. Wang. Fair Enough: Guaranteeing Approximate Max-
imin Shares. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 65(2):1–27, 2018.
[35] R. J. Lipton, E. Markakis, E. Mossel, and A. Saberi. On Approximately Fair Allocations of
Indivisible Goods. In Proceedings of the 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC),
pages 125–131, 2004.
[36] J. Nash. The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica, 18(2):155–162, 1950.
[37] A.S. Nesterov. Fairness and Efficiency in Strategy-Proof Object Allocation Mechanisms. Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, 170:145–168, 2017.
27
[38] J.B. Orlin. Improved Algorithms for Computing Fisher’s Market Clearing Prices. In Proceed-
ings of the 42nd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 291–300,
2010.
[39] J. Rawls. A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press, 1971.
[40] H. Scarf. An Analysis of Markets with a Large Number of Participants. In Recent Advances
in Game Theory, pages 127–155, 1962.
[41] E. Segal-Halevi and B.R. Sziklai. Monotonicity and Competitive Equilibrium in Cake-Cutting.
Economic Theory, 68(2):363–401, 2019.
[42] H. Steinhaus. The Problem of Fair Division. Econometrica, 16:101–104, 1948.
[43] W. Stromquist. How to Cut a Cake Fairly. American Mathematical Monthly, 87(8):640–644,
1980.
[44] W. Thomson. A Study of Choice Correspondences in Economies with a Variable Number of
Agents. Journal of Economic Theory, 46(2):237–254, 1988.
[45] H. Varian. Equity, Envy and Efficiency. Journal of Economic Theory, 9:63–91, 1974.
[46] L.A. Ve´gh. A Strongly Polynomial Algorithm for a Class of Minimum-Cost Flow Problems
with Separable Convex Objectives. SIAM Journal on Computing, 45(5):1729–1761, 2016.
[47] J. von Neumann. A Certain Zero-Sum Two-Person Game Equivalent to the Optimal Assign-
ment Problem. In W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker, editors, Contributions to the Theory of Games,
volume 2, pages 5–12. Princeton University Press, 1953.
Appendix
A Decomposition result of BUDISH ET AL. [18]
Let X be a fractional allocation. Recall that X satisfies column-wise feasibility constraints, namely
0 ≤
∑
i∈N Xi,j ≤ 1 for all j ∈ M . More generally, we can impose capacity constraints of the form
q
S
≤
∑
(i,j)∈S Xi,j ≤ qS , where S is a constraint set comprising of a collection of agent-object
pairs, and q
S
and qS are the lower and upper quotas for S, respectively. The set of all capacity
constraints imposed by a given problem is called the constraint structure H of the problem, and is
specified as a collection of all constraint sets and the corresponding quotas (q
S
, qS)S∈H. Given a
constraint structure H, we say that the fractional allocation X admits a feasible implementation
X := {(pk, Ak)}k∈[ℓ] if every integral allocation in its support also satisfies the constraints in H.
That is, for every k ∈ [ℓ], we have
q
S
≤
∑
(i,j)∈S A
k
i,j ≤ qS for every S ∈ H.
Definition 17 (Hierarchy and bihierarchy). A constraint structure H is said to be a hierarchy (or
a laminar family) if for every S, S′ ∈ H, we have that either S ⊂ S′, or S′ ⊂ S, or S ∩ S′ = ∅. We
say that H is a bihierarchy if it can be partitioned into two hierarchies, i.e., if there exist hierarchies
H1 and H2 such that H = H1 ∪H2 and H1 ∩H2 = ∅.
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As an example, consider the fractional allocation X in Figure 2. The row constraints (shown as
red or blue solid rectangles) as well as all singleton constraints of the form 0 ≤ Xi,j ≤ 1 (not shown
in the figure) together constitute a hierarchy, say H1, since for any pair of constraint sets, either
they are disjoint or one is completely contained inside the other. Similarly, the column constraints
(shown as gray dotted rectangles) form another hierarchy H2. Furthermore, H := H1 ∪ H2 is a
bihierarchy since any constraint set (rectangle or singleton) belongs to exactly one of H1 or H2.
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Figure 2: Decomposition of a fractional proportional allocation X into integral Prop1 allocations
A1, A2, and A3. The underlying fair division instance comprises of four goods and two agents with
valuations v1,1 = 10, v1,2 = 6, v1,3 = 4, v1,4 = 2 and v2,1 = 2, v2,2 = 10, v2,3 = 6, v2,4 = 4.
Budish et al. [18] showed that bihierarchy constraint structure is a sufficient condition for a
fractional allocation to admit a feasible implementation. We recall this result in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7 (Budish et al. [18]). Given a fractional allocation X satisfying a bihierarchy con-
straint structure H, one can compute, in strongly polynomial time, a set of coefficients p1, . . . , pℓ ∈
[0, 1] and integral allocations A1, . . . , Aℓ such that (a)
∑ℓ
k=1 p
k = 1, (b) each Ak satisfies the con-
straints in H, and (c) X =
∑ℓ
k=1 p
kAk.
Observe that the well-known Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem is a special case of Proposition 7
when H1 consists of all singleton as well as row constraints, H2 consists of all column constraints,
and the lower and upper quotas for each constraint set are 0 and 1, respectively. It is worth pointing
out that while Budish et al. [18] only note a polynomial running time, it is easy to check that their
(combinatorial) algorithm, in fact, runs in strongly polynomial time.
Budish et al. [18] use Proposition 7 to establish the utility guarantee (Proposition 4).
B Omitted Material from Section 5
For completeness, we provide a proof of the result mentioned by Conitzer et al. [22], that MNW
satisfies group fairness. Indeed, we prove a stronger result. We show that this holds not only for
the case of goods division, but in the more general cake-cutting setting.
In the cake-cutting setting, we have a single heterogeneous good modeled by M = [0, 1], and
each agent has an integrable valuation function vi : [0, 1] → R+. Each agent’s allocation, Ai, is a
finite union of intervals, and vi(Ai) is given by the area under the curve vi over the intervals in Ai.
A price function p is a measure on M . Say that a subset Z ⊆ M is a positive slice if there
exists an agent i with vi(Z) > 0. A pair (X, p) of allocation X and price p is a strong competitive
equilibrium from equal incomes (s-CEEI) [41] if the following conditions hold:
1. For every positive slice Z ⊆M , p(Z) > 0.
2. For every pair of positive slices Z ⊆M and Zi ⊆ Xi,
vi(Zi)
p(Zi)
≥ vi(Z)p(Z) .
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3. For every i ∈ N , p(Xi) = 1
Segal-Halevi and Sziklai [41] show that the MNW allocation is an s-CEEI allocation when p is the
standard price measure defined by, for all i ∈ N and all Zi ⊆ Xi, p(Zi) =
vi(Zi)
vi(Xi)
.
Proposition 8. MNW satisfies group fairness in the cake-cutting setting.
Proof. Consider an instance of cake cutting and suppose that the MNW/s-CEEI allocation X
violates group fairness. Then there exist subsets of agents S, T ⊆ N with |T | 6= 0 and an allocation
Y of ∪jXj among agents in S such that
|S|
|T | · vi(Yi) ≥ vi(Xi) for all agents i ∈ S and the inequality
is strict for at least one i ∈ S.
By the s-CEEI condition (2), we know that vi(Xi) =
vi(Xi)
p(Xi)
≥ vi(Yi)p(Yi) for all i ∈ S. Combining
this with the group fairness condition yields
|S|
|T |
· vi(Yi) ≥
vi(Yi)
p(Yi)
=⇒ p(Yi) ≥
|T |
|S|
for all i ∈ S, with at least one inequality strict. Taking the sum over all i ∈ S gives us
∑
i∈S p(Yi) >
|T |. Finally, because
∑
i∈S p(Yi) = p(∪i∈SYi) = p(∪j∈TXj) =
∑
j∈T p(Xj), it must be the case that
p(Xj) > 1 for some j ∈ T , violating the assumption that (X, p) is s-CEEI.
C Omitted Material from Section 6
C.1 Maximum Nash Welfare Variant
Relaxing group fairness. We now present a replication-imnvariant allocation rule that is not
a refinement of MNW. As a consequence of Theorem 5, it therefore fails group fairness. However,
we show that it satifies a relaxation of group fairness that still generalizes many of the fairness
properties common in the literature.
Say that good g is a weak good if there exists only a single agent with vi(g) > 0. Otherwise,
we say that g is a strong good. Let Wi = {g ∈ M : vj(g) = 0 ∀j 6= i} denote the set of all weak
goods valued positively by agent i.
Mechanism Maximum Nash Welfare Variant (MNW-V) works as follows. Given an instance I,
let I−W denote the instance with weak goods removed. Then MNW-V(I)i = MNW (I−W )i ∪Wi.
That is, we begin by allocating only the strong goods according to MNW. We then allocate to each
agent the weak goods that she values positively.
Example 3. Suppose there are three agents and two goods, g and g∗, with v1(g) = v2(g) = v3(g) =
1 and v1(g
∗) = 1 and v2(g
∗) = v3(g
∗) = 0. Note that g is a strong good and g∗ is a weak good,
valued only by agent 1. MNW allocates agents 1 and 2 half of g each, and all of g∗ to agent 3.
MNW-V, on the other hand, allocates each agent a 1/3 share of good g, and all of g∗ to agent
3. Note that MNWV does not satisfy group fairness. If we let S = N and T consist only of
agent 3, then we can partition agent 3’s bundle so that B1 = B2 =
1
6g, and B3 = g
∗, for utilities
v1(B1) = v2(B2) = 1/6 and v3(B3) = 1. When these utilities are scaled by a factor of |S|/|T | = 3,
each agent is strictly happier than under the original MNW-V allocation.
The above example shows that MNW-V violates group fairness. But we can show that the
allocation is fair to any group S provided that S is small relative to group T . We formalize this
using the following property.
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Definition 18. An allocation X is group fair for less if for all non-empty subsets of agents S, T ⊆ N
with |S| ≤ |T |, there is no allocation Y of the set of goods ∪i∈TXi among agents in S such that
|S|
|T | · vi(Yi) ≥ vi(Xi) for all agents i ∈ S and at least one inequality is strict.
In particular, group fairness for less generalizes proportionality, envy-freeness, Pareto optimality,
group envy-freeness [45, 11], and the core [40].
We show that MNW-V satisfies group fairness for less. As a consequence, a characterization of
MNW in the additive utility setting therefore seems to require the full power of group fairness.
Theorem 9. MNW-V satisfies group fairness for less.
Proof. Denote the MNW-V allocation on some instance I by A, and fix sets S and T with |S| ≤ |T |.
Since we know that MNW is group fair, for every partition (Bi)i∈S of ∪i∈T (Ai\Wi), we have either
|S|
|T |
· vi(Bi) < vi(Ai\Wi) (7)
for some i ∈ S, or
|S|
|T |
· vi(Bi) = vi(Ai\Wi) (8)
for all i ∈ S.
Fix a partition (Ci)i∈S of ∪i∈TAi, and for every i ∈ S denote by Bi the intersection of Ci with
the set of strong goods. (Bi)i∈S is a partition of ∪i∈T (Ai\Wi), so we must be in one of the two
cases above. Suppose we are in the first, with witness agent i. If i ∈ T , then Ci ⊆ Bi ∪Wi and we
have
|S|
|T |
· vi(Ci) ≤
|S|
|T |
· vi(Bi) +
|S|
|T |
· vi(Wi) < vi(Ai\Wi) + vi(Wi) = vi(Ai),
where the strict inequality follows from Equation 7. If i 6∈ T , then vi(Ci) = vi(Bi) (since no goods
from Wi are contained in ∪i∈TAi), and we have
|S|
|T |
· vi(Ci) =
|S|
|T |
· vi(Bi) < vi(Ai\Wi) ≤ vi(Ai).
In both cases, group fairness holds with respect to sets S and T .
A similar argument can be used if we are in the case corresponding to Equation 8, with the
relevant strict inequalities replaced by equalities.
C.2 Fractional Group Fairness Characterizes MNW
We now show that the dependence on replication invariance can be removed from Theorem 5
if group fairness is strengthened to fractional group fairness. Intuitively, fractional group fairness
extends group fairness to hold even for groups of agents that may consist of (hypothetical) fractional
agents. Denote a fractional subset of agents S = (xSi )i∈N , where x
S
i ∈ [0, 1] denotes the fraction of
agent i that is included in S. Define |S| =
∑
i∈N x
S
i .
Definition 19 (Fractional Group Fairness (FGF)). An allocation X is fractionally group fair if for
all fractional subsets of agents S, T ⊆ N with |T | 6= 0, there is no allocation Y of the set of goods
∪jx
T
j Xj among all agents such that
|S|
|T | · vi(Yi) ≥ x
S
i · vi(Xi) for all agents i ∈ N and the inequality
is strict for at least one i ∈ N with xSi > 0.
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Note that we recover group fairness (Definition 6) as a special case of FGF by restricting to the
subsets S and T with xSi ∈ {0, 1} and x
T
i ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N .
When we strengthen group fairness to fractional group fairness, we obtain a characterization of
MNW that does not require replication invariance.
Theorem 10. Any allocation rule that satisfies fractional group fairness must be a refinement of
MNW.
Proof. The proof proceeds in a similar manner to the proof of Theorem 5. Let f be an allocation
rule, and suppose that there exists an instance I for which there exists an allocation A ∈ f(I) but
A 6∈MNW (I). If A is not Pareto optimal then it violates group fairness. So suppose A is Pareto
optimal.
By Lemma 4, there exist agents i, j and X ⊆ Ai with vi(X) ∈ (0, vi(Ai)) and vj(X) > 0 such
that
vj(X) > vj(Aj) ·
vi(X)
vi(Ai −X)
. (9)
Let T = {i} (that is, xTi = 1 and x
T
k = 0 for all k 6= i) and S = {i} ∪ {
vi(X)
vi(Ai−X)
j} (that is,
xSi = 1, x
S
j =
vi(X)
vi(Ai−X)
, and xSk = 0 otherwise). Let Bi = Ai −X and Bj = X. Then
|S|
|T |
· vi(Bi) =
(
1 +
vi(X)
vi(Ai −X)
)
· vi(Ai −X) = vi(Ai −X) + vi(X) = x
T
i · vi(Ai)
and
|S|
|T |
· vj(Bj) ·
1
xSj
=
(
1 +
vi(X)
vi(Ai −X)
)
·
vi(Ai −X)
vi(X)
· vj(X)
=
vi(Ai)
vi(X)
· vj(X) >
vi(Ai −X)
vi(X)
· vj(X) > vj(Aj),
where the final inequality follows from Inequality 9. Fractional group fairness is violated.
As a consequence of Theorem 10 and Proposition 8, we know that the set of Maximum Nash
Welfare allocations coincides exactly with the set of fractionally group fair allocations. We note
that such a statement does not hold if we use only the more permissive axiom of group fairness.
Example 4. Consider an allocation problem with two goods and two agents. We have v1(g1) =
v2(g2) = 1, and v1(g2) = v2(g1) = ǫ for some small ǫ > 0. The only MNW allocation is to assign g1
to agent 1 and g2 to agent 2. But consider allocation A that sets A1 = g1 +
1
3g2 and A2 =
2
3g2. It
is easy to check that A is group fair despite not being an MNW allocation.
D Recursive Probabilistic Serial
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Algorithm 2 Eating
1: Input: A (possibly fractional) set of goods M ′.
2: Output: A fractional allocation X, integral allocations {Ak}k∈[ℓ], and coefficients {w
k}k∈[ℓ]
3: X ← fractional (partial) allocation of M ′ by running Probabilistic Serial for one unit of time10
4: return X
Algorithm 3 Recursive Probabilistic Serial (RPS)
1: Input: A (possibly fractional) set of goods M t.
2: Output: A fractional allocation Y t.
3: if M t = ∅ then
4: Y t ← ∅
5: else
6: Xt ← Eating(M t, 1)
7: BvN: Xt =
∑ℓ
k=1w
t,kAt,k
8: Y t ← Xt +
∑ℓ
k=1w
t,k ·RPS(M t \ At,k)
9: end if
10: return Y t
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